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CO-OPERATION OR SOVEREIGNTY? ACHIEVING FEDERALISATION OF CORPORATE 
REGULATION 
 
JUDITH MARYCHURCH* 
 
This paper will analyse the tensions between the harmonisation of law and the maintenance of 
sovereignty of member states in federal systems. The paper will focus on Australia and the European 
Union and the pressures faced, in light of the impact of globalisation, to resolve the issues that have 
plagued both jurisdictions for decades in achieving a satisfactory and sustainable model for corporate 
regulation on a federal level. 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
In contrast to other recognised federal systems, notably the United States and Canada, Australia still 
faces challenges to its national scheme of corporate law and regulation. Recent years have seen a 
resurgence in constitutional challenges posed to national regulation, and the adoption of another 
method of overcoming the limitations inherent in s 51(xx) of The Australian Constitution. The long 
history of difficulty in achieving a national scheme, and the continued importance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) as the national corporate regulator, provide valuable 
lessons for the European Union.1 The EU has also been struggling with the issues of harmonisation of 
corporate law in recent decades, particularly during the last three years, with the adoption of the 
Regulation on the Statute for the European Company in 2001.2 
 
The tensions between the interests of member states in both Australia and the EU have been 
instrumental in determining the paths towards harmonisation that have been adopted. This paper will 
seek to analyse the source of these tensions, including the impact of globalisation on the progress so 
far made. These tensions centre around the inherent conflict between the sovereignty of individual 
member states and the co-operation of those same states in achieving desired outcomes for the 
federation. This is reflective of the centralisation versus decentralisation debate common in federal 
systems. Evaluation of such debate is limited to a given point of time, as federations, and the balance 
between centralism and decentralism within them, changes over time. 
 
This article will first address the validity of the comparison between Australia and the EU. In 
particular, it will address the classification of the EU, in its current form, as a federal system. This will 
be followed by an analysis of the links between sovereignty and federalism, and subsequently the links 
between sovereignty and harmonisation. This latter section will analyse recent developments in 
Australia and the EU to provide a basis for the concluding remarks. 
 
II  THE EUROPEAN UNION – A FEDERAL SYSTEM? 
 
The initial hurdle that must be overcome in making a comparison between the paths adopted by 
Australia and the EU concerns the current framework of the two systems. It is conceded that the 
comparison is both non-traditional3 and concerns jurisdictions which are very different in size, 
composition and culture. Nevertheless, it is maintained that the comparison is both valid and useful, as 
will be outlined below. 
 
While there is no doubt that Australia is a federation, the nature of the grouping of nation states in the 
European Union is unprecedented in world history. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this grouping 
                                                     
* LLB (Hons) B Com, Lecturer, University of Wollongong. This article is based on a paper presented at the Corporate 
Law Teachers’ Association Annual Conference 2004, ANU, 9 & 10 February 2004. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the support of the Legal Scholarship Support Fund in producing this paper, and the research assistance 
provided by Sonia Dimoska, Julie Miehe and Matthew Wilson.   
1 Hereafter, the European Union will be referred to as the EU. 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company Available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/eur/lex/en/lif/dat/2001/en_301R2157.html> at 11 December 2001 (hereinafter ‘the Regulation’). 
3 The more conventional comparison adopted being between the United States and the EU. 
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can be classified as a ‘federation’ as the term has hitherto been understood.4 For this reason, it is 
necessary to establish whether or not the European Union in its current form can be described as a 
federation or federal system, and to consider the implications of the moves taken in 2003 toward a 
formalised federal system with a written constitution.   
  
According to Osborn’s Concise Legal Dictionary a federal state is: 
 
A State with a written constitution which apportions the sovereign power between a central or ‘federal’ legislature on 
the one hand, and a system of local legislatures on the other, in such a way that each is sovereign within its prescribed 
sphere, eg, the United States of America. The purpose is to hold minor communities together, or to reconcile national 
unity and power with the maintenance of State rights; there is union without unity.5 
 
The EU does not have a written constitution in the same sense as the United States, or Australia. 
However, written evidence that cannot be discounted is the series of treaties establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and ultimately the EU itself. This is also acknowledged by other 
theoretical writings on the classification of federations. King has described a federation as ‘a 
constitutional system which instances a division between central and regional governments and where 
special or entrenched representation is accorded to the regions in the decision-making procedures of 
the central government’.6 While again King refers to a constitutional system, it is acknowledged that a 
constitution need not be ‘written on paper or firmly imprinted on men’s minds’.7 A ‘basic controlling 
document or customary understanding’ providing for a continued and stable structure of government 
and peaceful mechanisms for change in the government may be seen as representing a constitutional 
arrangement. In this respect, the treaties establishing the EU may be seen as ‘constitutional’ 
documents. The two key integration treaties are the Treaty of Paris 1951 and the Treaty of Rome 
1957.8 
 
In an expanded definition of federation, King considers that a federation: 
 
is a state which is constitutionally divided into one central and two or more territorial (regional) governments. The 
responsibility of the centre is nation-wide, while that of the territories (regions) is mostly local. The central 
government is not sovereign in a manner which excludes the involvement of the regional units. This is because these 
units are constitutionally incorporated into the centre for certain purposes, as to do with the way in which the centre’s 
legislature is constituted or its executive appointed or constitutional amendments enacted.9  
 
The key institutions involved in law-making at the central level of the European Union are the Council 
and the Commission. The Council is comprised of ministers from each of the member states 
responsible for the policy area at issue at any particular meeting of the Council. Its chief role is to 
make decisions as to the adoption of legislation, which is typically proposed by the Commission, the 
executive agency of the EU. The Commission is responsible for the implementation of the treaties, and 
prepares all legislative proposals. It also intervenes at all stages of the legislative process to facilitate 
agreement within the Council or between the Council and the European Parliament.10 Adoption of 
legislation is determined alone by the Council in some policy areas or by joint decision of the Council 
and the European Parliament in areas specified by the treaties. The Parliament is elected by direct 
universal suffrage every five years, attempts to ensure democratic accountability of EU policy-making, 
and plays a role in some legislation, but most of its work occurs in committees. This is clearly a more 
limited role than many central parliaments in other federations, but the chief central law-making roles 
are fulfilled by the Council and the Commission, and are appropriately seen as central institutions with 
responsibility in restricted areas while the general law-making power resides with the member states.   
 
                                                     
4 There has been considerable academic writing on this. See, eg, Professor Dusan Sidjanski (English Translation by 
Mme Chamouni Stone), The Federal Approach to the European Union or The Quest For an Unprecedented 
European Federalism (Research Policy Paper No 14, Gropement D’Etudes et de Recherches, Notre Europe, July 
2001). 
5 Roger Bird, Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (7th ed, 1983) 145. 
6 Preston King, Federalism and Federation (1982) 140-1. 
7 Ibid 145. 
8 Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, France in the European Union (1998) 6; Treaty Establishing the European Coal & 
Steel Community, Paris, 18 April 1951; Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957. 
9 King, above n 6, 139-140. 
10 Guyomarch, Machin and Ritchie, above n 8, 12. 
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The European Community, the predecessor to the EU, has been described as an important 
development in the history of federalism, representing the re-emergence of confederation as a viable 
form of government.11 A confederation refers to a situation whereby several existing states combine to 
form a government for particular defined purposes.12 The unusual factor in the establishment of the 
European Community was the purpose behind it. Instead of the usual foreign affairs or defence 
purposes, the reason was economic. The Treaty Establishing the European Community13 identifies the 
purpose of the union in Article 2: 
 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union … to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high 
level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic 
and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
 
The economic imperative behind formation of the EC remains paramount in the EU today, and being 
the primary reason behind the sudden compromise which allowed the Regulation for the European 
Company, or the Societas Europaea − ‘SE’ − to be approved by the European Council. However, the 
strategy appears to be failing, with Western Europe forecast to be the slowest growing economic 
region in the world economy.14 However, the economies of the nations in transition to becoming 
member states of the EU are forecasted to be the fastest-growing.15 The difficulty is that the structure 
of the Regulation as currently adopted refers significant power and responsibility to the member states 
of the EU, without regard to the ability of those states to adequately exercise those powers and 
regulate the SEs formed under the Regulation. To date, no progress has been made in establishing the 
administrative structure necessary to regulate the SE in key member states of the EU, including 
Britain, Germany, France and Spain, nor in nominating the ‘competent authorities’ to be responsible 
for regulation of the SE.16 The Regulation is due to come into effect on 8 October 2004. To this point, 
the economic benefits originally sought to be attained by the SE do not appear likely to be achieved.17   
 
The federal characteristics already present in the institutional structure of the EU, combined with the 
moves taken in 2003 towards a true federation of States in the EU, justify the classification of the EU 
as a federal system for the purposes of this article. 
 
III  SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERALISM 
 
When examining the significant developments in the structure of corporate law in Australia and the 
EU in 2001, one is struck by the history of difficulties each jurisdiction has faced in casting, and 
implementing, the legislative framework for corporate law, particularly from the perspective of state 
sovereignty. Indeed, the issue of state sovereignty has been at the heart of the problems faced in 
Australia in legislating for corporations since the decision in Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v 
Moorehead.18 Similarly, difficulties founded in matters of state sovereignty have been behind the thirty 
year delay in adoption of the Regulation for the SE. These difficulties also shed light on the reasons 
behind the substantive provisions of the Regulation which refer extensive powers over SEs to 
individual member states. 
 
Where does sovereignty lie in a federal system? In order to answer this question, one must have a 
conception of what sovereignty is. It is inappropriate when examining a federal system to see 
sovereignty in absolute terms, where one agent acts to the exclusion of all others. This definition is too 
                                                     
11 Elazar, Exploring Federalism (1987) 52-53. 
12 Ibid 53. 
13 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957.  
14 EU Business Week, Issue 203, 19 December 2003, available at <http://www.eubusiness.com>.   
15 Ibid 14. 
16 Article 68 provides are to make appropriate provision for the application of the Regulation, including the designation 
of competent authorities to regulate SEs. 
17 The anticipated cost savings have been put at $30 billion per year – Schulz & Anor, ‘The European Company Statute 
– the German View’ (2001) 29(10) Intertax 332. The author has not been able to substantiate the method of 
calculation of this figure. 
18 Huddart Park & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
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absolutist for most States, not just federations.19 The very nature of a federal system centres around a 
division of power between regional governments and the central government, and this division of 
power may be centralised, decentralised or balanced between these levels – or anywhere in between.   
 
In respect of corporate law, the balance of legislative power in Australia has shifted over time. Under 
The Australian Constitution, the federal parliament’s power is limited to ‘foreign corporations, and 
trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth’.20 It is clear from 
decisions such as NSW v The Commonwealth21 that the federal parliament may not make legislation for 
the formation of companies, but may pass legislation with respect to foreign corporations, by 
definition incorporated outside Australia, and trading or financial corporations already created under 
State law. This restriction on Commonwealth power set the scene for a succession of schemes aimed 
at achieving consistency in the regulation of companies incorporated under State law, including the 
Uniform Companies Acts scheme of the 1960s; the Co-operative scheme of the 1980s; and the 
national scheme of ‘federalised’ corporate law in the 1990s, which was essentially ‘undone’ by the 
decisions in Re Wakim; Exparte McNally22 and R v Hughes.23 It was these decisions that ultimately 
resulted in the referral of State power over corporations to the Commonwealth under s 51(xxxvii) of 
the Australian Constitution, and the shift of legislative power from the states to the Commonwealth, at 
least until 2006. However, the difficulties involved in finally achieving this referral are demonstrative 
of the importance of the states in the balance of power, and the potential for their future influence on 
the structure of corporate law in Australia. 
 
The adoption of the Regulation for the SE in 2001 may be seen as the culmination of a difficult and 
lengthy journey over a period more than thirty years. However, the form and effect of the Regulation 
has left many questions unanswered and has in fact created a very different company than was 
originally envisaged.24  
 
Ebke has considered the nature of company law and lawmaking in the EU, and its position along the 
centralised/decentralised spectrum.25 The purpose of his article at the time was ‘to develop answers to 
the still unsettled question of how much uniformity in corporate law is needed and how much state 
regulation of corporate affairs is desirable to accomplish the objectives of the EU’.26 As has been 
charted elsewhere, there has been a shift in terminology in relation to the co-ordination of corporate 
law in the EU from ‘harmonisation’ to ‘approximation’,27 with a decreased emphasis on uniformity of 
law. The EU, in its quest to give effect to a corporate form that has been commonly identified as one 
of the key components of a successful move to an integrated single economy, appears to have 
abandoned uniformity and central regulation of a transnational corporation in favour of a corporate 
form which is European in name rather than in substance.   
 
Early proposals for a European Company envisaged a truly European corporation operating at a level 
independent of the laws of the members states, that is, at a central or federal level. In particular, the 
proposal envisaged a corporate form that would operate free of the constraints of national/member 
state laws, particularly the impossibility of cross-border mergers. The Regulation as adopted is highly 
dependent on the laws of member states for the substance of the governing law of the SE, and the 
application of that law via member state regulatory agencies. As such, substantive aspects of what 
would otherwise appear to be a central, European law are to be determined at a decentralised, or 
member state level. 
                                                     
19 King, above n 6, 141. 
20 The Australian Constitution, s 51(xx). 
21 NSW v The Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482. Also Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 
330. 
22 Re Wakim; Exparte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
23 R v Hughes (2000) 34 ACSR 92. 
24 For analysis of the SE see J Marychurch, ‘Societas Europaea – Harmonisation or Proliferation of Corporations Law 
in the EU’ (2002) Australian International Law Journal 80; See also F Blanquet ‘European Company Statute (SE)’ 
(2002) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 56. 
25 Ebke, ‘Company Law and the European Union: Centralised versus Decentralised Lawmaking’ (1997) 31(4) 
International Lawyer 961.   
26  Ibid, 964. 
27 See for analysis of the SE see Marychurch, above n 24, 83-6. 
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The ultimate effect of this position is to place the EU and Australia in opposite positions in respect of 
the form or framework of federal corporate law on the one hand, and the substance of that law on the 
other hand. In Australia, the states essentially have the power to determine the framework of corporate 
law in Australia. This power arguably persists to this day despite the referral of powers at the heart of 
the current national scheme, due to the five-year sunset clause which expires in 2006. At the same 
time, the substance of corporate law has been primarily determined at the federal level, with state 
influence via the Ministerial Council for Corporations,28 for several decades. The European Union has 
now adopted a federal corporate form, primarily in response to the economic pressures of 
globalisation, via central legislation, but the significant referral of substantive issues to the laws of the 
member states mean that key aspects of the operation of the SE are determined at a decentralised level, 
and will result in significant variations between SEs according to the member state of their formation. 
 
IV  SOVEREIGNTY AND HARMONISATION 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that the maintenance of sovereignty of member states in federal 
systems is key in the area of corporate law. This is reflected in the United States, Australia and the EU. 
The desire to maintain this dominance takes precedence over economic imperatives, including those 
imposed by the pressures of globalisation. Issues of sovereignty have significantly influenced the path 
of harmonisation of corporate law in both Australia and the EU, and their respective positions along 
the federal spectrum between centralisation and decentralisation. This is particularly clear in the 
example of the European company, the SE, which will be especially difficult to implement compared 
to the national system currently operating in the Australian context. In Australia, corporate law is 
currently based on the referral of powers. This model is both adequate and sustainable while the states 
agree to the current sovereignty balance, but is potentially at risk of the states essentially holding the 
Commonwealth to ransom. In contrast, despite a three year transition period leading up to the 
implementation of the Regulation in October this year, member states, in whose favour the powers 
over the SE clearly fall, have made no progress towards implementation of the administrative 
structures necessary to implement the SE.   
 
What are the pressures faced in light of globalisation to harmonise corporate law? The factors are both 
economic and cultural.  Evidence of this can be found in the experiences of both Australia and the EU. 
As will be demonstrated in the subsequent analysis, the economic and cultural factors are often 
inherently linked, both to one another and to factors best described as being political in nature. As 
such, unravelling them is difficult, but also instructive in understanding the path of harmonisation 
hitherto taken in these jurisdictions and the directions this process is taking. The factors affecting the 
position in Australia will first be analysed, followed by the EU.  
 
The decision in NSW v The Commonwealth29 gave rise to, at the very least, perceptions that the 
decision ‘may have therefore done irreparable damage to Australian business interests and the 
Australian economy’.30 Re Wakim had the same effect, precipitating a great deal of political and 
academic discussion on the impact of the case and the way forward. However, when faced with this 
structural crisis in Australian corporate law in 1999 and 2000, a return to State regulation was never 
seriously contemplated. The alternatives that were considered were: 
 
 A referendum to amend the Constitution to expand the Commonwealth’s power to regulate 
corporations 
 
 A referral of powers by the States to the Commonwealth pursuant to s 51(37) of the Constitution 
 
                                                     
28 This body was the continuation of the Ministerial Council established in 1978, and comprised of the Commonwealth 
Minister responsible for the administration of the Commonwealth Corporations legislation (the permanent chairman) 
and states ministerial representatives, with legislative proposal and voting procedures overall favouring the influence 
of the Commonwealth: Ford, Austin & Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (10th ed, 2001) 48. 
29 NSW v The Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482. 
30 R McQueen, ‘Why High Court Judges Make Poor Historians: The Corporations Act Case and Early Attempts to 
Establish A National System of Company Regulation in Australia’ (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 245, 264. 
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 A split system of regulation between the States and the Commonwealth, with States legislating for 
the incorporation of companies (and potentially other matters) with fundraising and other matters 
regulated by the Commonwealth 
 
A referendum in the timeframe necessary to resolve the uncertainty created by the decisions in Re 
Wakim and R v Hughes would have been unlikely to succeed. The decision to reject the split system 
had effectively been made in 1990, with the states agreement to the co-operative nationalised scheme, 
including the central regulation of ASIC. In August 2000, State Attorneys General reached an in 
principle agreement to refer their powers over corporations to the Commonwealth Parliament pursuant 
to s 51(xxxvii). While there were last minute hiccoughs delaying the implementation of the referral 
until 15 July 2001, overall it would be fair to say that the States did agree, with relative co-operation, 
to the referral. Michael Whincop, has posed the question as to why the States so readily agreed to 
essentially write themselves out of the regulatory scheme.31 Whincop saw the choice between state and 
federal regulation as having already been made with the States’ assent to the Alice Springs Agreement 
a decade earlier, although neither an economic analysis of the decision in Re Wakim nor R v Hughes 
compelled a referral of powers as the best or most appropriate solution.32   
 
It must also be recalled that the referral of powers was not achieved without some difficulty. The 
attorney general of Western Australia and South Australia initially indicated opposition to a referral,33 
resulting in a delay of the implementation of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) from 1 January 2001 to 
1 July 2001, and ultimately to 15 July 2001. This refusal to participate, although ultimately reversed, 
does demonstrate the impact of legal culture of the states of Australia, in particular a culture of fear of 
loss of power or sovereignty, particularly in relation to key economic and social issues including 
industrial relations. Ultimately, when the referral was agreed to, it was on the basis of a strict 
restriction on the extent of the referral, in particular the exclusion of the possibility of the 
Commonwealth using the power to legislate in relation to industrial issues. The sunset clause of five 
years34 for the referral is also demonstrative of not just skepticism in relation to the operation of the 
scheme, but also an unwillingness to hand over legislative power to the Commonwealth on any more 
permanent a basis because of fear of loss of sovereignty. As such, there are clearly limits to the co-
operation the states are willing to give, and these limits are at the least influenced by, if not determined 
by, notions of sovereignty. 
 
Significant parallels can be drawn between the factors influencing the paths taken towards 
harmonisation in the EU and those in Australia. In the EU, the factors behind the pressure of 
globalisation to harmonise law are again both cultural and economic, the two being very much 
entwined in the history of the EU’s path to a single European market. The vast majority of company 
law in the European Union is individual to the member states, as would be expected given the very 
different legal histories, cultures and regulatory systems of the member states. The implementation of 
the European single market was never intended to involve removal of corporate law from the member 
states. For the majority of small to medium companies and a substantial number of larger enterprises, 
the corporate laws of the member states are largely adequate. Rather than a whole-scale replacement 
of these individual systems, the EU has long pursued a path of harmonisation of the national corporate 
laws of the member states via a series of Directives. Six of these Directives are aimed at company law 
                                                     
31 Whincop, ‘The National Scheme for Corporations and the Referral of Powers: A Skeptical View’ (2001) 12 Public 
Law Review 263, 263. 
32 Ibid, 264. The Alice Springs Heads of Agreement was concluded in Alice Springs on 29 June 1990, by 
representatives of the Commonwealth, the States and the Northern Territory. Pursuant to this agreement, uniform 
legislation based on the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) and the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) was 
prepared, with necessary changes to enable the Acts to apply in the States and the Northern territory. The 
Commonwealth passed these two Acts to apply to the Australian Capital Territory pursuant to s 52(i) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, and the States and the Northern territory passed acts applying the Commonwealth Law 
in their jurisdictions, via State legislation entitled Corporations ([name of particular State]) Act 1990 and the 
Corporations (Northern Territory) Act 1990, respectively. The Commonwealth undertook to compensate the States 
for loss of income from State regulatory bodies with the ASC taking over sole administrative and regulatory 
responsibilities for corporate law. See Ford, Austin & Ramsay, above n 27, 48-49. 
33 I Ramsay, Challenges to Australia’s Federal Corporate La’, 5 <http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu. 
 au/research-papers/hoffman.pdf> at 2 December 2002. 
34 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (NSW) s 5. 
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harmonisation.35 Four other directives address corporate accounting principles,36 which are intended to 
achieve consistent corporate accounting principles across the member states. Additional draft 
Directives also exist.37 Most were implemented in the period 1970-1989, with the most notable 
exception being the Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a 
European company with regard to the involvement of employees,38 which was considered a pre-
requisite to the Regulation for the SE.  
 
This Directive and the Regulation for the SE were adopted together, illustrating that resolution of the 
worker participation issue had facilitated the final adoption of the Regulation. The language used in 
the Directive compared with the Regulation is interesting. The Directive retains reference to the 
Regulation being aimed: 
 
at creating a uniform legal framework within which companies from different Member States should be able to plan 
and carry out the reorganisation of their business on a Community scale.39  
 
In contrast, the Directive subsequently recognises that: 
 
[t]he great diversity of rules and practices existing in the Member States as regards the manner in which employees’ 
representatives are involved in decision-making within companies makes it inadvisable to set up a single European 
model of employee involvement applicable to the SE.40 
 
This reflects the decision to maintain the sovereignty of Member States over worker participation and 
the subjugation of the status of the harmonisation process as a result. The negotiation over the termsof 
the Directive has a long history, dating back at least twenty years.41 The diversity in culture in relation 
to the issue of worker participation, and its consequent political sensitivity has been the key obstacle in 
reaching consensus among the Member States in the EU. Kolvenbach notes the genesis of the 
company law harmonisation program as having:  
 
as its principal components the coordination, safeguarding, protection and equivalence necessary to protect 
shareholders, creditors, customers, potential investors and last, but not least, the employees of the companies in the 
Member States.42 
 
At the time of Kolvenbach’s detailed analysis of the company law harmonisation program and the 
influence of the worker participation issue, the approach adopted was a federal one, where the 
harmonisation results in little influence by the Member States.43 Kolvenbach expressly noted that the 
harmonisation process ‘is as much political in character as it is technical’.44 The truth of this statement 
is evident in the form and substance of the Directive, which only applies to worker participation in an 
                                                     
35 Disclosure and the validity of obligations entered into by, and the nullity of companies with limited liability: first 
Directive (1968); The formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their 
capital: second Directive (1976); Domestic mergers of public limited liability companies: third Directive (1978); 
Division of public limited liability companies: sixth Directive (1982); Single-member private limited liability 
companies: twelfth Directive (1989). 
36 Annual accounts of companies with limited liability: fourth Directive (1978); Consolidated accounts of companies 
with limited liability: seventh Directive (1983); Qualifications of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory 
audits of accounting documents: eighth Directive (1984); Disclosure requirements in respect of branches: eleventh 
Directive (1989).  
37 Structure of public limited companies: proposal for a fifth Directive; Cross-border mergers of public limited 
companies: proposal for a tenth Directive; Takeover bids: proposal for a thirteenth Directive. 
38 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of October 2001 supplementing the Statute for the European company with regard to 
the involvement of employees, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/2001/en_301L0086.html> at 7 January 2002.  
(hereinafter ‘the Directive’).   
39 Council Directive, above n 38 Preface, para (2). 
40 Ibid para (5). 
41  Kolvenbach, ‘EEC Company Law Harmonization And Worker Participation’ 11(4) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Business Law 709, 748. 
42 Kolvenbach, above n 40, 709. 
43 Ibid, 712. 
44 Ibid. 
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SE,45 and the Regulation for the SE, ultimately adopted in 2001. The Directive forms ‘an indissociable 
complement to this Regulation and must be applied concomitantly’.46   
 
The Directive ‘is designed to ensure that employees have a right of involvement in issues and 
decisions affecting the life of their SE’.47 The Regulation and the Directive have the combined effect 
of putting into place a flexible framework for a choice of structure for the SE, which is expressed in 
Article 38 of the Regulation as follows: 
 
Under the conditions laid down by this Regulation an SE shall comprise 
(a) a general meeting of shareholders and 
(b) either a supervisory organ and a management organ (two-tier system) or an administrative organ (one-tier 
system) depending on the form adopted in the statutes.48 
 
Under the two-tier system, the management organ, the members of which are appointed and removed 
by the supervisory organ49 is responsible for management of the SE.50 The supervisory organ, 
appointed by the general meeting51 is to supervise the management of the SE, but may not itself 
exercise management powers.52 The decision as to the structure of the SE is made prior to the 
formation of a proposed SE, and the Directive expressly ‘governs the involvement of employees in the 
affairs of European public limited-liability companies’,53 that is, SEs.  In order to achieve this goal, the 
Directive requires the involvement of employees in every SE in accordance with a negotiating 
procedure laid out in the Directive.54  Under these provisions, negotiation is to take place between 
employee and employer representatives ‘as soon as possible after publishing the draft terms of merger 
or creating a holding company or after agreeing a plan to form a subsidiary or to transform into an 
SE’.55 The negotiations are to be conducted between representatives of the companies participating in 
the formation of the SE and representatives of those companies’ employees with a view to forming a 
written agreement for the involvement of employees in the SE.56 If the rights negotiated for employees 
under this process result in a reduction of participation rights, the majority required for approval of the 
agreement increases from an absolute majority of the members of the special negotiating body, 
provided that such a body also represents an absolute majority of employees57 increases to a two thirds 
majority, including the votes of members representing employees employed in at least two Member 
States.58 Additional provisions deal with the situation of a special negotiating body being unable to 
reach an agreement.59   
 
The adoption of a flexible system that is likely to result in ‘a considerable variety of participation rules 
throughout the Member States’60 is demonstrative of both the economic and cultural imperatives in an 
era of globalisation of business and corporate activity. Issues of industrial and legal culture in the EU 
combined to contribute, in significant part, to the delay of more than thirty years in the adoption of the 
Regulation for the SE. Ultimately, it was the economic pressures of globalisation that forced the issue: 
for the EU to be able to compete with the other global economic powers like the United States, it 
needed the stability and economic advantages of the single European market. The availability of a 
European company was key in this process. However, the Regulation could never have been adopted 
                                                     
45 The original proposal for a Directive addressing the worker participation issue envisaged a harmonisation of the rules 
for worker participation across the Member States rather than harmonisation within a European company alone.  
46 Regulation, above n 2, Preface para (19). 
47 Ibid para (21). 
48 Reference in the Regulation to ‘statutes’ is a reference to the SE’s internal management rules. 
49 Regulation, above n 2,  Article 39(2). 
50 Ibid Article 39(1). 
51 Ibid Article 40(2). 
52 Ibid Article 40(1). 
53 Directive, above n 37, Article 1(1). 
54 Ibid Article 1(2). 
55 Ibid Article 3(1). 
56 Ibid Article 3(3). 
57 Ibid Article 3(4). 
58 Ibid. A minimum proportion of employees of the participating companies must be planned to come under those 
participation rules.  The actual proportions depend on the nature of formation of the SE – 25 percent for formation by 
merger; 50 percent for a holding or subsidiary SE.   
59 Directive, above n 37, Article 3(6). 
60 Schulz & Anor, above n 17, 337. 
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without Member State agreement on the issue of worker participation. As a result, fast-tracking of the 
Regulation required equal speed in resolution of an issue that was social, industrial, corporate and 
long-standing in character. The significant differences between the cultures of the Member States in 
relation to worker participation61 meant that agreement was going to be difficult to achieve. While 
some Member States were willing to compromise, those at opposing ends of the spectrum, notably the 
United Kingdom and Germany62 were not willing to do so.  In this sense, the Regulation and Directive 
again reveal the importance of the maintenance of state sovereignty above the economic objectives of 
a federal system, taking into account that cultural issues in this respect meant that it was politically 
unacceptable for a Member State to accept the loss of sovereignty over worker participation.   
 
 
 
V  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The primary reason for the fast-tracking of the Regulation for the SE over 2000 and 2001 was 
economic. The intention was to enhance the competitiveness of European companies by enabling them 
to operate via more efficient corporate structures free of the impediments posed by existing 
national/member state company law. The current framework provided for the SE in the Regulation 
does not give effect to this intention. The structure and substance of the Regulation does not provide a 
satisfactory nor sustainable model for regulation of a European company. In particular, insufficient 
attention has been paid to administration and regulation of the SE via appropriate regulatory bodies. 
Australia has been down this path before, and the most viable structure for corporate regulation of 
companies operating across state boundaries has proven to require central regulation of a single law. It 
would be foolish and inappropriate to advocate the harmonisation of company law at all levels in the 
EU. The primary focus of this paper is on the proposed European company in light of the pressure for 
a harmonised law for reasons of global economic competitiveness. This corporate form was always 
intended to supplement existing national company law and operate on a different level, suitable 
primarily for enterprises operating on a pan-European basis. The difficulty now is that the model 
adopted, with its significant reference to the laws of the member states, means that the Regulation for 
the European company, like previous models of corporate law and regulation in Australia, is 
decentralised to the extent that the original objectives of the SE are unlikely to be met. The continuing 
difficulty that may yet rear its head again in Australia, and will continue to do so in the EU, is state 
sovereignty. The maintenance of sovereignty does come at a cost – and in the EU the cost is likely to 
be an unsuccessful model for the European company, which will essentially require a return to the 
drawing board rather than a resolution of the issues behind the already thirty year long delay in 
adoption of the Regulation for the European company. 
 
 
                                                     
61 Ranging from no worker participation in the United Kingdom, to significant involvement in company management in 
Germany. 
62 Kolvenbach, above n 40, 722-724. 
